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The Course of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
In Utah: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.-
A Turning of the Tide 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Unless an employment contract contemplates that it is for a speci-
fied period of time, the relationship between the employer and em-
ployee is deemed to be that of "employment-at-will."1 Under employ-
ment-at-will relationships, "an employer may discharge an employee 
for ':1 good cause, a bad cause, or no cause at all."2 
During the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, most states 
judicially adopted the employment-at-will doctrine, justifying it on 
grounds of freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise. 3 The ration-
ale given to the adoption of the employment-at-will rule is not particu-
larly surprising since at the time of its inception employment law was 
"hostile to collective employee action, worker tort claims for job related 
injuries, and legislative attempts to regulate employment terms."4 To-
day, however, legislative exceptions to freedom of contract idealism 
have been enacted to encourage collective bargaining11 and to establish 
substantive prohibitions on certain types of conduct6 giving employees a 
more equal bargaining position with their employers. 7 In the absence of 
a collective bargaining agreement, a written or oral employment con-
tract, or a statutory prohibition on the reason for termination of em-
1. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 335 (1974). 
2. /d. (footnote omitted); see also Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488 (lOth Cir. 
1984); Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987); Note, Continental Air Lines 
v. Keenan: Employee Handbooks as a Modification to Employment at Will, 60 U. CoLO. L. REV. 
169, 169 (1989). 
3. Note, supra note 1, at 335. 
4. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 637 
(1988) (citing Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 118, 127-32 (1976); McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major 
Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'y 20, 20-33)). 
5. Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988). 
6. /d.; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982); Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp.); Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII 
(Equal Employment Opportunities), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991) 
7. Leonard, supra note 4, at 642. 
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ployment, the common law rule of employment-at-will has endured in 
theory. Recently, however, the exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine have been construed so broadly and applied so liberally that 
the doctrine now provides little more than an analytical framework for 
adjudication of claims. In reality, the rule seems to be that an employer 
must have "just cause" for terminating an employee. 
This note discusses the development of the employment-at-will 
doctrine in Utah and the Utah Supreme Court's recent recognition of 
exceptions to the doctrine that place the traditional employment-at-will 
presumption in jeopardy. Part II of this note discusses the traditional 
underpinnings of the employment-at-will presumption. Part III traces 
the employment-at-will doctrine's development in the Utah Supreme 
Court. Part IV analyzes Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. 8 Part V ex-
amines Utah employment-at-will cases decided since Berube and offers 
guidelines for employers who wish to preserve their employment-at-
will status. 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL 
DocTRINE 
A. Adoption of Employment-At-Will in America 
Like most common law theories, the employment-at-will doctrine 
finds its roots in English common law.9 In nineteenth century England, 
courts almost universally held that a general hiring10 amounted to an 
employment contract one year in duration. 11 Early American cases fol-
lowed the English rule/2 however, by the 1870s American courts had 
strayed from the English rule and used varying approaches to define 
employment relationships. 13 
In 1877, Horace Gray Wood authored a treatise14 that became the 
cornerstone of the employment-at-will doctrine in America. 111 Wood's 
treatise formulated the rule as follows: 
8. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
9. See Note, supra note 1, at 340. 
10. In England, the term "general hiring" refers to a hiring without a specified time period. 
In America, the phrase "indefinite hiring" is employed. /d. (citing Annotation, Duration of Con-
tract of Hiring Which Specified No Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain Amount Per 
Day, Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921)). 
11. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989) (citing Note, supra 
note I, at 340); Leonard, supra note 4, at 640. 
12. Note, supra note 1, at 340-41 (citing Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 
(1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882)). 
13. Leonard, supra note 4, at 640 (citations omitted). 
14. H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134 (1877). 
15. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040 (citing Note, supra note 1, at 341). 
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With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is 
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a 
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hir-
ing at so much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, 
is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a 
day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may 
serve.18 
251 
Wood cited four American cases as authority for his proposition/7 
however, these cases are "apparently inapposite authority on [his pro-
position's] behalf."18 Moreover, Wood offered no real analysis to sup-
port his formulation of the rule. 19 
Despite the criticism that Wood's formulation has received in re-
cent years, 20 most courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s adopted the 
statement as correct.21 Although Wood did not critically analyze his 
formulation of the rule, several commentators have speculated as to 
why the rule was so adopted. 22 
B. justifications for Adoption of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
1. Principles of contract 
Courts usually approach employment-at-will cases by applying 
traditional contract principles such as "consideration, mutuality of obli-
gation, and express or implied covenants."23 Contract analysis arguably 
justifies the doctrine since conceptually the employer gives as considera-
tion a promise to pay the employee for the work performed and the 
employee returns as consideration the promise to perform work for the 
16. H. Woon, supra note 14, at § 134. 
17. Wilder's Case, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. 
Wilder, 80 U.S. 254 (1872); De Briar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. 
Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871), cited in Note, 
supra note 1, at 341 n.53. 
18. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040 (citing Note, supra note 1, at 340-41). 
19. Note, supra note 1, at 340-41. 
20. See, e.g., Berube, 771 P.2d at 1040-41; Leonard, supra note 4, at 640-41; Note, supra 
note I, at 341-43. 
21. See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117,42 N.E. 416 (1895) (citing 
the following cases as also adopting Wood's rule: Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); De 
Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1879); Evans v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 24 Mo. 
App. 114 (1887); Finger v. Koch & Shilling Brewing Co., 13 Mo. App. 310 (1883); Prentiss v. 
Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131 (1871); see also Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 
1908); Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. (1 Penne.) 581,43 A. 609 (1899); McCullough 
Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887)). 
22. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 640-41; Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against 
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. Rt:v. 1816, 1824-
28 (1980); Note, supra note 1, at 342-47. 
23. Leonard, supra note 4, at 636. 
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employer. Accordingly, to ensure that the employee will not be dis-
charged, except for cause, some courts have held that the employee 
must give additional independant consideration.24 Moreover, since an 
employee seldom promises to quit only for just cause, arguably, mutu-
ality of obligation allows the employer to terminate the employee at any 
time for any reason. 
Contracts between employers and employees, however, are not so 
simple. Unlike parties to most contracts, employees and employers 
closely interact for the greater part of each day. Furthermore, jobs pro-
vide the livelihood upon which most people rely. Without jobs, people 
and their families would lack even the basic necessities of life. Indeed, 
the loss of a job, for many, can be one of the most tramatic and devas-
tating experiences one might face. Perhaps this reason alone explains 
why so much legislation has been enacted to protect employees from 
termination for certain reasons. 211 
Since employment contracts involve such dissimilar circumstances 
than do most other contracts, the doctrine of employment-at-will re-
quires a basis other than contract analysis to justify its continued 
existence. 
2. Freedom of contract 
Probably the most justifiable basis for adherence to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is America's strong belief in freedom of contract. 
During the late Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century, the 
principle of freedom of contract was even more prevalent than today. In 
Adair v. United States,26 the United States Supreme Court held that 
an employer's right to terminate an employee should be equated with 
the employee's right to quit. 27 In doing so, the Court struck down a 
federal regulation barring common carriers from firing employees for 
unionizing. 28 
The influence of contractual freedom in employment agreements 
was fostered by the government's laissez-faire attitude toward indus-
try.29 Policies allowing employers and employees freedom to dissolve 
their contractual relationships as they wished allowed industrial capi-
24. See, e.g., Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986) (citing Annotation, Validity 
and Duration of Contract Purporting to Be for Permanent Employment, 60 A.L.R.3d 226, 233 
(1974)). 
25. See statutes cited supra note 6. 
26. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
27. Jd. at 174. 
28. Id. at 179-80. 
29. Leonard, supra note 4, at 641. 
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talism to flourish. 30 Since employers could terminate employees at any 
time for any reason, employee productivity increased due to the tremen-
dous motivation for employees to produce or lose their job.31 
Today, however, attitudes of both the government and the popu-
lace have changed. Federal and state governments are increasingly re-
stricting employers' freedom to contract as they wish. 32 Collective bar-
gaining is now encouraged to reduce the great disparity in the 
negotiating positions of employers and employees. 33 Yet "while labor 
unions have succeeded in obtaining a just cause standard for employ-
ment termination in most collective bargaining agreements, such agree-
ments cover [only] a small and declining portion of the work force." 34 
Nevertheless, because of the changes in attitude and the disparity 
among the rights of workers protected by statute or collective bargain-
ing agreements and those excluded from such job security schemes, sev-
eral exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine have been judicially 
adopted. 
C. Common Law Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine 
Both enactment of statutory regulations prohibiting the discharge 
of employees for certain reasons311 and protection afforded by collective 
bargaining agreements have often subjected employees in the same la-
bor pool, or perhaps of the same employer, to vast disparities in job 
security. One commentator has stated: 
Under the at will presumption, employees who lack union representa-
tion, do not belong to protected minority groups, or do not engage in 
protected activities have no enforceable right to continued employ-
ment-regardless of the quality of their work and the continued exis-
tence of their jobs-while the employee at the next work station may 
have such a right by virtue of minority group membership, and the 
employee of a neighboring company will have the protection due to 
union representation. . . . Furthermore, public sector employees, 
whose salaries and benefits are paid from taxes extracted from the 
unprotected private sector employees, may have enforceable employ-
ment rights due to federal or state civil service regulations and consti-
tutional protections against arbitrary decision making by their govern-
mental employers.38 
30. /d. 
31. See id. 
32. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 6. 
33. See Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988). 
34. Leonard, supra note 4, at 644 (footnote omitted). 
35. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 6. 
36. Leonard, supra note 4, at 647 (footnote omitted). 
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Perhaps these inequalities among co-workers have been the pri-
mary motivating factor for judicially-created exceptions to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Exceptions to the doctrine can be placed into 
three primary categories:37 (1) the public policy exception, (2) the ex-
press or implied contract term exception, and (3) the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing exception.38 
1. The public policy exception 
Until the late 1950s, the employment-at-will presumption re-
mained unpenetrated unless legislation explicitly prohibited employee 
discharge for a specific reason. 39 The practices of some employers were 
so subversive to modern principles of employment law and ideals of 
fairness that one could scarcely imagine a more capricious doctrine of 
law. 
Not until 1959, in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters,40 did a court look beyond the explicit language of a statute 
to identify its underlying rationale or policy and apply it as an excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine.41 In Petermann, the California Court of 
Appeal held that termination of an employee for his refusal to commit 
perjury before the California legislature gave rise to a claim for wrong-
ful termination.42 While not expressly prohibited by statute, termina-
tion of Mr. Petermann for refusing to perjure himself so undermined 
legislative policy that the court grafted a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine.43 
Since Petermann, the public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine has been further expanded. The logical and fundamen-
tal reason for the public policy exception 
is that the traditional formulation of the at will rule . . . would 
undermine legislative attempts to enhance social welfare if too rigidly 
observed, or would sanction behavior inimical to general societal in-
terests embraced in the common law. As with the statutory excep-
tions,•• the public policy exception does not replace the at will pre-
sumption, but instead provides a mechanism for identifying 
37. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Utah 1989). 
38. /d. 
39. Note, Remedies for Employer's Wrongful Discharge for an Employee from Employment 
of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REv. 54 7, 556 (1988). 
40. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
41. Note, supra note 39, at 556-57. 
42. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 28. 
43. /d. 
44. See statutes cited supra note 6. 
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illegitimate reasons for discharge.'~ 
Just what is "public policy"-or a violation thereof-is a question 
that has troubled courts in many areas of the law. The primary source 
of guidance for the courts as to what constitutes public policy is legisla-
tive action and the constitutional principles that underlie statutory 
schemes.46 It is not surprising that legislative declarations are the 
source most often looked to for guidance since, theoretically, legislatures 
act in accordance with public attitudes and sentiment. Thus, legislative 
actions should reflect the social and moral ideals of the general 
populace. 
Legislative enactments, however, are not the exclusive source for 
determining "public policy.""'7 Courts also look to executive orders, 
rules, and regulations for enlightenment in defining the bounds of 
"public policy."48 Quite often courts examine their own prior holdings 
and the holdings of other courts to see if a discharge has violated judi-
cially-created public policy.49 In formulating public policy out of the 
common law, courts attempt to derive principles from the common law 
that reflect "notions of evolving standards of conduct appropriate in 
society."50 Standards of appropriate conduct of one generation, how-
ever, may differ from the socially desirable standards embodied in the 
public policy of another generation. 51 
That public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine 
did not surface until the late 1950s does not mean such exceptions were 
not inherent in the doctrine when Wood's formulation was adopted. 52 
At the turn of the century, many of the interests protected today were 
socially undesirable. 53 Thus, the protection of such interests and rights 
was not embodied in the "public policy" of the era, and an employee 
discharge for reasons now viewed as capricious and subversive did not 
violate public policy. 
While what constitutes public policy may be difficult to discern, 
one court declared that "public policy" is "that principle of law which 
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be 
45. Leonard, supra note 4, at 657-58 (footnote added) (citations omitted). 
46. See id. at 659. 
47. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989). 
48. Leonard, supra note 4, at 659. 
49. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043. 
50. Leonard, supra note 4, at 658. 
51. See Berube, 771 P.2d at 1043 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 
(1930)). 
52. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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injurious to the public or against the public good."114 However, a court 
may define "public policy," it is almost universally held that a dis-
charge in violation of discernable public policy falls within an exception 
to the employment-at-will rule and, the employee can thereby pursue a 
claim for wrongful termination. 
2. The express or implied contract term exception 
The rule stated in Wood's 1877 treatise1111 that "a general or indef-
inite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will"116 remains theoretically in-
tact today. Under most state's laws, however, the employment-at-will 
presumption is rebuttable and is not a substantive rule of law.117 Obvi-
ously, if an employment contract expressly states that it is for a speci-
fied term, no employment-at-will presumption arises. Similarly, how-
ever, even when there is an indefinite hiring, an employee may rebut 
the at-will presumption by producing extrinsic evidence that the parties 
intended employment to continue for a definite time or that the em-
ployee would be discharged only for just cause. 
In Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 118 the Federal District 
Court for the District of Virginia stated: 
In absence of an express provision or specific contract setting a defi-
nite period of employment, the presumption of an employee's at will 
status may be rebutted by presenting evidence which shows that the 
parties intended and/or understood that the term of employment was 
fixed by reference to some articuable standard or procedure. There 
must be evidence of a custom, practice or policy that governs the em-
ployer-employee relationship. Evidence sufficient to establish an im-
plied contract concerning duration of employment effectively rebuts 
the presumption of at will status and binds the employer to the terms 
of such a contract. 59 
The California Court of Appeal similarly stated the rule. "The pre-
sumption that an employment contract is intended to be terminable at 
will is subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This [evi-
dence] may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that the 
relationship will continue for some fixed period of time." 60 
54. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188, 344 P.2d 25, 
27 (1959), cited in Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042. 
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
56. H. Wooo, supra note 14, at § 134. 
57. See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409, 413-16 (W.O. Va. 
1985). 
58. 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.O. Va. 1985). 
59. /d. at 416. 
60. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924 (1981) 
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Recently, courts have begun to abandon the historic prerequi-
sites-mutuality of obligation and/or independant consideration-toes-
tablish "for cause" employment.61 Addressing the mutuality of obliga-
tion and independent consideration issues, the Thompson court stated: 
[e)ven if the employee can still quit at will, the contract is not void for 
lack of consideration; there is no requirement of complete mutuality 
of obligation. 
[A)n employee's continued service and his failure to exercise his 
power to terminate his employment is sufficient consideration for an 
additional promise by the employer [to not terminate except for 
cause).82 
Courts are now increasingly looking to other extrinsic facts that 
readily imply a durational hiring or termination "for cause" only stan-
dard. They find intent to impose such restrictions through informal 
statements by (or assurances of) managers and supervisors63 through 
policy directives,64 personnel policies or practices of the employer,611 the 
length of time the employee has worked for the employer,66 practices 
within the particular industry,67 statements contained in employment 
manuals,68 or any other circumstances which might demonstrate the in-
tent of the parties.69 
The recognition of a court's ability to look not only for mutuality 
of obligation and/or independent consideration but also for any other 
circumstance demonstrating the intent of the parties has bolstered liti-
gation under the employment-at-will doctrine. 70 Now, more than half 
of the states have recognized the express or implied contract term ex-
ception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 71 
Despite the expansion of the express or implied contract exception, 
most courts have not allowed an exception where an employment con-
(citing Millsap v. National Funding Corp., 57 Cal. App. 2d 772, 775, 135 P.2d 407, 409 (1943)) 
(emphasis added). 
61. "For cause employment" refers to an employment relationship where the employee will 
only be discharged when his/her performance is insufficient in some way. 
62. Thompson, 623 F. Supp. at 414 (quoting Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 
1154, 1161 (W.O. Va. 1984)). 
63. Leonard, supra note 4, at 649. 
64. Id. 
65. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981). 
66. Id. (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 
(1980)). 
67. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926. 
68. See, e.g., Thompson v. American Motor Inns, 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.O. Va. 1985). 
69. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). 
70. See Leonard, supra note 4, at 635. 
71. Id. 
258 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
tract bases compensation on a monthly or annual salary.72 Neverthe-
less, in Hartman v. C. W. Travel, Inc. 73 the court held that summary 
judgment for the employer was improper since the written employment 
agreement contained a provision for annual employee review. 74 The 
reference to an annual employee review was the only fact from which 
an implied-in-fact relationship could arise.76 If this "implied-in-fact" 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine continues to expand, it is 
probable that the entire notion of employment-at-will might be wholly 
abandoned. 
3. Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception 
Many courts have recognized that inherent in every contract is an 
implied covenant that the parties will deal fairly and in good faith with 
each other.76 In this regard, some states have held employment con-
tracts to be no different than other contracts in allowing the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing to be imposed by force of law.77 Other state 
courts only imply such a covenant "where the conduct or words of the 
parties indicate that they contemplated such a covenant."78 Still, other 
courts have construed the implied covenant even more narrowly, apply-
ing it only where previously earned obligations are owed.79 In Monge 
v. Beebe Rubber Co.,80 however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
expanded the implied covenant exception by adopting a balancing test. 
The court formulated a breach of the covenant as follows: 
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, 
the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be 
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his em-
ployment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance 
between the two. We hold that a termination by the employer of a 
contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or 
malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the eco-
nomic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the em-
72. See, e.g., Hartman v. C.W. Travel, Inc., 792 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1 986). 
73. 792 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
74. /d. at 1181. 
75. See id. 
76. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985). 
77. See Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp. of America, 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1 964), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); Cleary v. American Airlines, 1 1 1 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. 722 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Berube v. 
Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046 (Utah 1989). 
78. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1046 (discussing Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 
274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984)). 
79. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
80. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). 
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ployment contract. Such a rule affords the employee a certain stability 
of employment and does not interfere with the employer's normal ex-
ercise of his right to discharge, which is necessary to permit him to 
operate his business efficiently and profitably.81 
259 
Another court expanded the theory of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing even further. It reasoned that an employee's longevity 
alone-eighteen years-provided a basis for breach of the implied 
covenant. 82 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,83 
stated that termination of an at-will employee without cause may not 
be tantamount to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.8 " The court instead felt that whether. the implied covenant 
was breached must "be determined in light of all relevant circum-
stances, including the contract's terms, the employer's conduct, and the 
employee's reasonable expectations."811 
Courts have not applied the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing exception to the employment-at-will doctrine consistently. 
A significant minority of courts have, however, recognized its existence 
and applied it to do justice in wrongful termination cases.86 
III. DEVELOPMENT oF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DocTRINE IN 
UTAH 
The Utah Supreme Court first considered the employment-at-will 
doctrine in Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co. 87 Price involved an 
attorney who, after representing Western Loan for several years, was 
hired as an employee at a salary of $100 per month.88 In a letter dated 
May 3, 1904, Mr. Price confirmed the salary and other terms of the 
employment contract.89 The letter stated that Mr. Price's services were 
"to continue so long as [they] are as satisfactory as they have been the 
past two years."90 In holding that Mr. Price was terminable at the will 
of Western Loan, the court stated that since Mr. Price "could termi-
nate the contract at will" and since "[t]he only consideration that 
81. Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-552 (citations omitted), quoted in Leonard, 
supra note 4, at 654. 
82. Cleary, Ill Cal. App. 3d at 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 722. 
83. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
84. /d. at 1046 (dicta). 
85. /d. at 1046-47 (footnote omitted). 
86. See cases cited supra notes 77-79. 
87. 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677 (1909). 
88. /d. at 382, 100 P. at 678. 
89. /d. 
90. /d. (quoting Letter from C.S. Price to Western Loan & Savings Co. (May 3, 1904)). 
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passed from [Mr. Price] ... was his promise to perform the services," 
the contract "lacked the essential element of mutuality of obligation and 
was terminable at will by either party."91 
Like most states adopting the doctrine of employment-at-will, 
Utah did so without any effort to define an underlying rationale for the 
doctrine. In Price, the court simply referred to "a line of well-reasoned 
cases"92 and adopted the doctrine as stated in Wood's 1877 treatise. 93 
In 1918, the court had the opportunity to reevaluate the rule 
adopted in Price. In Hancock v. Luke,94 the plaintiff sought recission of 
a contract that, in addition to other terms, provided for employment.95 
Speaking through Justice Corfman, the majority followed Price stating, 
"the contract lacked the . . . element of mutuality, and therefore was 
terminable by either party at will."98 
The issue of employment-at-will was not again revisited by the 
Utah Supreme Court until 1957 in Held v. American Linen Supply 
Co. 97 Held involved an employee covered under the terms of a union's 
collective bargaining agreement.98 The collective bargaining agreement 
was intended, inter alia, "[t]o effectuate a spirit of fair dealings be-
tween employer and employee .... "99 The provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement pertinent to Ms. Held's claim stated, "The Com-
pany agrees not to suspend, discipline, discharge or discriminate 
against any employee for lawful union activities."100 
When Ms. Held was discharged, she brought an action claiming 
that the "discharge was without just cause and therefore in violation of 
the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement." 101 Af-
ter an arbitrator found that the discharge was not motivated by her 
union activities, Ms. Held brought an action in state district court for 
wrongful discharge. 102 The district court denied the employer's motion 
to dismiss, holding that "even in the absence of an express provision [in 
the collective bargaining agreement] an employee covered by it could 
91. Id. at 387, 100 P. at 680. 
92. Id. at 386, 100 P. at 680. 
93. H. Wooo, supra note 14, at § 134. 
94. 52 Utah 142, 173 P. 137 (1918). 
95. Id. at 144. 173 P. at 137. 
96. ld. at 152, 173 P. at 140. 
97. 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957). 
98. ld. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210. 
99. ld. (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between American Linen Supply Co. and 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union No. 562). 
100. Id. at 108, 307 P.2d at 211 (quoting from article III of the collective bargaining agree-
ment) (emphasis added). 
101. Id. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210. 
102. ld. at 108-09, 307 P.2d at 211. 
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not be discharged without just cause."103 The employer appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
The supreme court, apparently adopting the express or implied 
contract term exception, stated that whether an employee has a cause of 
action for being discharged without just cause "depends upon the terms 
of the contract, either express or implied .... " 104 The court, how-
ever, was reluctant to imply a durational term or discharge for cause 
only term into the contract, absent ambiguity in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, because if such had been intended "it could easily have 
been incorporated in the agreement .... " 106 
In Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 106 the court con-
tinued its strong reluctance to imply durational terms of employment 
absent ambiguity in a written employment contract. There, the court 
refused to allow the employee to introduce parol evidence that the em-
ployment contract was for a minimum specified time period. 107 Instead, 
the court unanimously held that "[t]he fact that [the employee's] option 
to subscribe to stock only existed as long as she was employed suggests 
that either party could terminate such employment at will."108 In 
Crane Co. v. Dahle, 109 the court restated the employment-at-will doc-
trine: "In the absence of a contract for a definite term, an employee 
may quit whenever he desires, the same as the employer may fire 
him."110 
Again in 1979, the court adhered to the traditional employment-
at-will presumption in Bihlmaier v. Carson. 111 In Bihlmaier, the court 
stated that since "the final oral employment contract contained no ex-
press terms concerning the duration of the plaintiff's employment," the 
employment relationship was terminable at the will of either party. 112 
The court justified its reasoning on the lack of a stipulated duration 
103. /d. at 107, 307 P.2d at 210. 
104. /d. at 109, 307 P.2d at 211. The court stated: 
In the absence of something in the contract of employment to fix a definite term of 
service, or other contractual provision to restrict the right of the employer to discharge, 
or some statutory restriction upon this right, an employer may lawfully discharge an 
employee at what time he pleases and for what cause he chooses, without thereby be-
coming liable to an action against him. A general contract of hiring is ordinarily 
deemed a contract terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee. 
/d. (quoting 35 AM. juR. Master and Servant§ 34 (1941)). 
105. /d. 
106. 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). 
107. /d. at 6, 354 P.2d at 562. 
108. Id. 
109. 576 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978). 
110. /d. at 872. 
111. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
112. /d. at 792. 
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and the lack of "good consideration in addition to the services con-
tracted to be rendered."118 
While in early cases the Utah Supreme Court's attention was fo-
cused primarily on the prerequisites of "mutuality of obligation" and 
"independant consideration,"114 in Held, Bullock, and Crane Co., the 
court seemed to focus more on discerning whether an intent for dura-
tiona! employment existed. In Bihlmaier, however, the court again 
raised the issue of additional consideration. 116 The "additional good 
consideration" exception to the at-will doctrine became one of the 
court's primary focuses in Rose v. Allied Development Co. 116 
Rose involved an employee who, after becoming manager of the 
shoe departments at three of the employers' stores, wished to return to 
school while continuing his employment. 117 When Rose expressed his 
desire to attend school to his supervisor, he was told that it would be 
fine so long as he continued to work forty-five hours per week and 
made sure that the sales floor was supervised at all times. 118 Rose, who 
was able to make the required arrangements,119 was nevertheless dis-
charged due to his unavailability at peak sales times and the inflexibil-
ity of his schedule.120 Rose sued, "alleging breach of contract, promis-
sory estoppel, contractual wrongful discharge, tortious wrongful 
discharge, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing."121 Affirming summary judgment for the defendant employer, 
the court deemed the relationship as "employment-at-will."122 
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the traditional 
"absolute right [of the employer] to discharge employees has been 
somewhat limited by subsequent federal and state legislation."123 Thus, 
for the first time the court implicitly adopted the "public policy excep-
tion"124 to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
The court then specifically discussed its prior recognition of the 
"express or implied contract term exception" to the doctrine. 125 Stating 
113. !d.; see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
114. See Hancock v. Luke, 52 Utah 142, 152, 173 P. 137, 140 (1918); Price v. Western 
Loan & Sav. Co., 35 Utah 379, 382, 100 P. 677, 678 (1909). 
115. Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 792. 
116. 719 P.2d 83, 86-87 (Utah 1986). 
117. ld. at 83-84. 
118. ld. at 84. 
119. !d. 
120. !d. 
121. !d. 
122. !d. 
123. Id. at 85. 
124. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. 
125. Rose, 719 P.2d at 85-86 (citing Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979)). 
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that the "totality of the circumstances and the intent of both parties"126 
did not contemplate a definite term of employment, the court held that 
this case did not fall into the "implied contract" exception. The court's 
ruling in this regard, however, differed from prior employment-at-will 
cases. 127 In prior cases, the court was demonstratively reluctant to ex-
amine factors extrinsic to the actual contract terms, unless those terms 
were ambiguous. 128 In contrast, the Rose court stated, "We must look 
at the alleged 'understanding,' the intent of the parties, business custom 
and usage, the nature of the employment, the situation of the parties, 
and the circumstances of the case to ascertain the terms of the claimed 
agreement. " 129 
Nevertheless, the Rose court ruled that the existence of contract 
terms altering the presumption of employment-at-will status must be 
established by something more than an employee's "subjective under-
standings or expectations."130 Despite the court's failure to recognize 
the case as falling within the "express or implied contract term excep-
tion," Rose signaled the court's desire to expand the exception. The 
court undertook this expansion in Berube. 131 
The Rose court also gave considerable attention to whether the 
employee had given consideration to the employer "in addition to the 
services already required .... " 132 Finding that Allied, the employer, 
"did not accrue any benefit by plaintiff's attendance at school," the 
court held that no additional consideration had been given to effect a 
rebuttal of the employment-at-will presumption. 133 
Finally, the Rose court addressed the plaintiffs contention that the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel should allow him recovery. 134 The 
plaintiff claimed that his detrimental reliance on his supervisor's prom-
ise that his attending school would be fine was compensable.135 The 
court held that invoking promissory estoppel would be improper since 
Rose was not justified in assuming that Allied intended to alter the at-
126. /d. at 85. 
127. See e.g., Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge 
Truck Center, Inc. 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 
Utah 2d 106, 307 P.Zd 210 (1957). 
128. See cases cited supra note 127. 
129. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). 
130. /d. 
131. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) (discussed infra). 
132. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86 (emphasis in original). 
133. /d. 
134. /d. at 87. 
135. !d. The damages claimed to be suffered by the plaintiff were the cost of his tuition and 
books ($1,742.81) and, of course, the loss of his job. /d. at 84. 
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will relationship. 136 In sum, the court adhered to its prior holding in 
Bullock where it "refused to override the at-will doctrine to imply a 
term of employment in the contract to which the employer had not ex-
pressly agreed. "137 
One significant contention raised by the employee in Rose that the 
court simply did not address was the alleged breach of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing. The court's failure to reach the 
issue is particularly peculiar since a significant number of courts had 
previously recognized the covenant in employment contracts138 and the 
Utah court had itself recognized the inherent existence of the implied 
covenant in every contract. 139 
Why the court did not address whether a breach of the implied 
covenant had occurred is unknown. What is apparent, however, is that 
the court was not yet ready to recognize or even discuss breach of the 
implied covenant as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 
Recall that in Held the court failed to address this same issue, even 
when the express aim of the collective bargaining agreement was "[t]o 
effectuate a spirit of fair dealings between employer and employee."140 
To summarize Utah law prior to Berube,141 the Utah Supreme 
Court had recognized the "public policy" and "express or implied con-
tract term" exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. More im-
portant, however, was the Court's demonstrated reluctance to imply 
durational terms into employment contracts. Moreover, the court had 
implicitly refused to even consider whether a breach of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing would form an exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. 
136. /d. at 87. 
137. /d. (emphasis added). 
138. See Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp. of America, 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 
917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Dare v. Montana 
Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 
N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). 
139. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). 
140. Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106, 107, 307 P.2d 210, 210 (1957). 
141. 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
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IV. BERUBE v. FASHION CENTRE, LTD. 
A. Facts 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,142 involved an employee who, af-
ter beginning work in 1979 as a sales clerk, had been promoted to as-
sistant manager of the employer's Fashion Gal clothing store located in 
Ogden, Utah.143 Ms. Berube's past promotions had been based on her 
job performance and demonstrated ability.144 At one point, Ms. Berube 
was even told "she could expect to be a store manager someday." 1411 
The employer had a written disciplinary policy providing that em-
ployees would not be terminated "without prior warning except for 
specific reasons, including failure to pass or refusal to take a polygraph 
examination."146 Employees were promised "a warning and an oppor-
tunity to improve performance" in all other circumstances. 147 Ms. Ber-
ube's agreement with Fashion Centre did not contemplate a specified 
term of employment. 148 However, Ms. Berube believed that she would 
only be terminated for cause because of the procedures outlined in the 
written disciplinary policy and other representations made to her. 149 
Due to an apparent inventory shortage in the fall of 1981, Fashion 
Centre conducted an investigation. 1110 Pursuant to the investigation, 
Fashion Centre requested all employees at the Ogden store to submit to 
a polygraph examination. 1111 After submitting to two polygraph exami-
nations, the first of which showed signs of deception on one of fifteen 
questions, Fashion Centre asked Ms. Berube to undergo a third exami-
nation.1112 Feeling nervous and apprehensive about the third examina-
tion, Ms. Berube asked that it be rescheduled for the following day. 1113 
Ms. Berube's request was denied, and she was terminated for not tak-
ing the third examination on the requested day. 
Ms. Berube subsequently filed suit alleging, among other things, 
wrongful discharge and breach of her employment contract. 1114 At trial, 
the jury found for Fashion Centre and Ms. Berube appealed based on 
142. /d. 
143. /d. at 1035. 
144. /d. 
145. /d. at 1036. 
146. /d. 
147. /d. 
148. /d. 
149. /d. 
150. /d. 
151. /d. 
152. /d. 
153. /d. at 1037. 
154. /d. 
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the trial court's refusal to allow jury instructions on the exceptions to 
the employment-at-will doctrine. 166 
B. The Court's Analysis 
After undertaking an analysis of the surreptitious examination and 
negligence claims/66 Justice Durham, writing for a plurality, reexam-
ined the status of the employment-at-will doctrine in Utah.167 After 
briefly reviewing the historical background of the doctrine/68 Justice 
Durham turned her attention to the exceptions to the rule, 169 summa-
rily recognizing "the development of three primary categories of excep-
tions to the at-will rule."160 
Reviewing the "public policy" exception, Justice Durham stated 
that it was "[p]erhaps the most logical."161 Quoting Petermann v. In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 162 the plurality opinion stated 
that "'public policy' is ... that principle of law which holds that no 
citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the 
public or against the public good."163 
The plurality recognized that the source of discerning public pol-
icy includes both legislative and judicial pronouncements. 164 This ex-
pansion of the source of public policy was limited, however, by requir-
ing that any quality deducible as "public policy, must be 'fundamental 
and permanent' and not merely 'superficial and transitory' changing 
from one generation to the next."166 Justice Durham formulated the 
application of the public policy exception as follows: "we will construe 
public policies narrowly and will generally utilize those based on prior 
legislative pronouncements or judicial decisions, applying only those 
principles which are so substantial and fundamental that there can be 
virtually no question as to their importance for promotion of the public 
155. ld. Berube also appealed the trial court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint 
to add a cause of action based on statutory prohibitions of surreptitious examinations (UTAH 
ConE ANN.§ 34-37-16 (1988)) and the granting of summary judgment to another named defend-
ant. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1037. 
156. ld. at 1037-39. 
157. ld. at 1040. 
158. ld. at 1040-41. 
159. For a more complete discussion of the history and development of the doctrine, see 
supra notes 9-79 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 1; Leonard, supra note 4. 
160. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1041. 
161. ld. at 1042. 
162. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). 
163. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1042 (citations omitted). 
164. ld. at 1042-43. 
165. ld. at 1043. 
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good."lee 
Holding that all principles of "public policy" should apply to du-
rational hiring as well as indefinite hiring/67 the court unanimously 
agreed that the public policy exception had no application in the pre-
sent case and should not be applied broadly to make it routinely a vio-
lation of public policy to discharge an employee in breach of an em-
ployment-for-cause agreement. 168 
Turning to the implied or express contract exception, Justice Dur-
ham's opinion characterized the at-will presumption as "merely a rule 
of contract construction and not a legal principle."169 Stating that "rigid 
adherence to the at-will rule is no longer justified or advisable," the 
plurality held that the traditional presumption could be rebutted by evi-
dence found in "employment manuals, oral agreements, and all cir-
cumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to termi-
nate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified 
period."170 Such factors include "conduct of the parties, announced per-
sonnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other 
circumstances which show the existence of such a promise."171 
On this point, however, Justice Durham carried but one other 
vote. Justices Howe and Hall, concurring, found it unnecessary and 
inappropriate to look beyond the written policy manual of the employer 
since they believed that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Berube's 
termination violated Fashion Centre's written policy manual. 172 Simi-
larly, Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion stated "representations 
made by the employer in employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are 
legitimate sources for determining the apparent intentions of the par-
ties. Because we need go no further than this to decide the present case, 
I see no need to fix the precise parameters of the implied-in-fact excep-
tion."173 Justice Zimmerman then stated that if the case presented such 
an issue, he would not give an expansive application of the exception 
and would not allow every fact to be offered in rebuttal since such an 
application would afford little predictability to employers.174 
166. /d. (footnote omitted). 
167. /d. at 1043 n.10. 
168. /d. at 1043, 1051. See Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1989). 
169. /d. at 1044 (citing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 
1983)). 
170. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044 (emphasis added). 
171. /d. (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 613 (1984); Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)). 
172. /d. at 1050 (Howe, J. concurring). 
173. /d. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
174. /d. 
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Thus, it appears that presently two justices, Durham and Stewart, 
would allow all facts and circumstances to be considered in determin-
ing if an implied-in-fact "for-cause" employment relationship has been 
established. Justice Zimmerman would allow only manuals, bulletins, 
and other legitimate writing to be offered to rebut the presumption. 
Justice Howe and Hall have not spoken on the issue but rather have 
reserved that question for a more appropriate case. 
A three member majority of the court expressly disavowed the re-
quirement of "mutuality of obligation" before a "termination "for 
cause" only relationship could arise. 1711 Justice Durham stated that the 
fundamental assumption of mutuality of obligation-that "because an 
employee may terminate . . . at any time, the employer should likewise 
be free to do so" -is unfounded and illusory in a modern economy. 176 
Presumably, the principle would be illusory because the employee's 
motivation to quit is much less than the employer's motivation to fire 
since the burden the employer faces in replacing an employee is light 
compared to the tremendous reliance employees place on maintaining 
their jobs. 
Justice Durham also discounted the traditional requirement of in-
dependent consideration. Instead of making independent consideration a 
"prerequisite" to finding "for cause" employment, Justice Durham 
considered it just another factor among the totality of circumstances to 
be considered in finding an implied contract of "for cause" employ-
ment.177 Justice Zimmerman agreed that logically there is no reason to 
require mutuality of obligation or separate consideration as prerequi-
sites to an employment for cause relationship. 178 Justices Howe and 
Hall did not address the issue. 
The plurality, per Justice Durham, applied this expanded formu-
lation of the implied contract exception broadly, finding that, in addi-
tion to some express terms/79 implied terms from favorable perform-
ance reviews, comments that she had a promising future and would 
advance in the company, and the fact that Ms. Berube had advanced 
rapidly, created both a justified expectation and implied contract that 
175. See Berube, 771 P.2d at 1045, 1051 (The majority consists of Justices Durham, Stew-
art, and Zimmerman). 
176. /d. at 1045. 
177. /d. 
178. /d. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
179. The express terms were contained in the disciplinary action policy distributed to em-
ployees of Fashion Centre that an employee would be terminated without prior warning only for 
certain reasons (i.e., refusal to take or failure to pass a polygraph), but that in all other circum-
stances, employees would be given a proper warning and an opportunity to improve performance. 
/d. at 1047. 
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Ms. Berube would be terminated only for cause.180 
It is somewhat unclear, however, whether the implied contract ex-
ceptions to the at-will presumption will be applied so expansively. Jus-
tice Zimmerman would not do so. Justices Howe and Hall seem reluc-
tant to do so and in the midst of Justice Durham's broad formulation of 
the exception, she states "(a)n implied-in-fact promise cannot, of course, 
contradict a written contract term."181 Thus, it would seem that if an 
employer distributes a manual or bulletin expressly stating that the re-
lationship was to be that of employment-at-will, an employee could not 
even introduce extrinsic evidence of comments or assurances to form an 
implied contract of "for cause" employment. In Berube, the employer's 
disciplinary policy listed the circumstances specifying when an em-
ployee would be terminated without warning. Therefore, the issue re-
mains open as to whether the distinguishable case of an employment 
manual or memorandum simply stating that the relationship is "at-
will" without enunciating specific reasons for termination will allow 
the employee to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove an implied con-
tract of "for cause" employment. How the court will rule on this issue 
remains to be seen. The author, however, believes the "implied con-
tract" exception will continually broaden until it eventually swallows 
the "at-will" presumption. 
Finally, the Berube court addressed whether it would recognize a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an 
exception to the employment-at-will rule. Justice Durham opened by 
stating that Utah has implied such a covenant into every contract, and 
that implication, in her belief, included employment contracts.182 Rec-
ognizing that there is no clear majority application of the exception, 
Justice Durham asserted that the correct application is to examine "the 
employer's conduct viewed in the context of the relevant contractual 
terms, express or implied, and the employee's reasonable expecta-
tions."183 Justice Durham then stated that the exception should "be 
used sparingly and with caution"184 and that damages should be deter-
mined by contract law, which limits damages to only reasonable fore-
seeable consequential damages. 1811 
Applying her formulation of the exception, Justice Durham be-
180. /d. at 1048. 
181. /d. at 1044 (citing Shapiro v. Wells, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,482,199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 
622 (1984)). 
182. /d. at 1046 (citing Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985)). 
183. /d. at 1046 (citing Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 
3d 241, 253, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (1984 )). 
184. /d. at 1047. 
185. /d. at 1046. 
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lieved that Ms. Berube had stated a claim for relief under the excep-
tion.188 The basis for this finding was her feeling that Fashion Centre 
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in requiring Ms. Berube to sub-
mit to three polygraph examinations over the course of several months 
based on one inventory shortage and that this was done despite Ms. 
Berube's willingness to submit to the third test if it were rescheduled. 187 
The case was remanded for final determination by a jury on this issue. 
While Justices Howe and Hall did not address the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing exception, Justice Zimmerman 
sharply disagreed with its application. 188 Justice Zimmerman, while 
appearing hostile to recognizing the exception due to the unpredictabil-
ity employers would face, did not wholly reject the exception's applica-
tion if it were required to do justice in a particular case.189 Thus, while 
not completely rejecting the notion, a three member majority declined to 
recognize a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in employment contracts.190 
V. DoCTRINE OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL IN UTAH SINCE Berube 
A series of cases decided since Berube gives some indication as to 
how the three exceptions to the employment-at-will rule will be ap-
plied. The "public policy" exception has not been seriously considered 
since Berube. In Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 191 how-
ever, Justice Zimmerman, in a four-to-one decision/92 stated that the 
court had not adopted the "public policy" exception broadly and that 
the exception would not "routinely make it a violation of public policy 
to discharge an employee in breach of an employment agreement [of 
"for cause" termination only]. " 193 As for the "implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing" exception, three separate decisions-two of the 
Utah Supreme Court and one from the Federal District Court for the 
District of Utah-have expressly held that this exception has not yet 
been recognized in Utah. 194 
The "express or implied-in-fact contract" exception, however, has 
186. /d. at 1047. 
187. /d. at 1049. 
188. /d. at 1051 (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
189. Id. at 1052 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
190. See Howcroft v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 712 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (D. Utah 
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been applied broadly and has in practical effect probably emasculated 
the employment-at-will presumption. In Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area 
Community Action Program/96 subsequent to an admittedly at-will 
hiring, the employer issued a manual that set forth termination proce-
dures.196 When those procedures were not correctly followed, the em-
ployee sued and ultimately prevailed on the employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment since, under Berube, an employee can rebut the at-will 
presumption with evidence contained in employment manuals. 197 In 
Caldwell, the court affirmed the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment.198 It did so, however, on the basis that in terminating the em-
ployee, the employer complied with all requirements that would have 
been implied by the terms of a bulletin issued after an employment-at-
will hiring.199 
This broad application of the implied-in-fact contract exception 
has turned the at-will doctrine on its head, except for the analytical 
framework that the doctrine provides. Utah employers must now be 
sure that neither formal nor informal policies or practices create rea-
sonable expectations in employees that they will be terminated for 
cause only. To be sure, employers must avoid giving assurances, such 
as "keep up the good work and you will be with this company for a 
long time" and "don't worry, when it comes to your job, you have 
nothing to worry about." Conceivably, such assurances, even if infor-
mally made, could give rise to a rebuttal of the at-will presumption. 
Other popular employer practices might also give rise to implied-
in-fact contracts of termination "for cause" only. Initial probationary 
periods, manuals listing certain grounds for termination, prior warn-
ings (formal or informal), annual employee reviews, and progressive 
disciplinary steps all offer ammunition to employees wishing to rebut 
the at-will presumption. 
Some options which an employer might use to avoid being a "for 
cause" employer would be to issue periodical memorandums renounc-
ing any previous assurances or promises from supervisors and stating 
that the employment relationship remains "at-will" absent a written 
contract signed by the employer stating otherwise. Employers may also 
use express written contracts precluding inconsistent implied terms. 
Employment manuals might contain disclaimers of "for cause" employ-
195. 775 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 1989). 
196. Id. at 941. 
197. /d. at 942. 
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that the employee was entitled to a jury trial since termination procedures set forth in an employ-
ment manual could rebut the at-will presumption). 
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ment language so long as they are unqualified, prominently displayed, 
and expressly state that the manual is a complete integration of all 
terms of employment. The well-advised employer would also maintain 
thorough records of employee misconduct or poor performance in the 
event that he or she may need to formulate a cause for termination. 
The timing for communicating terms of employment is also of 
great importance. As previously stated, an employer must take careful 
steps to renounce any indications of "for cause" employment given after 
an at-will relationship has been established. Likewise, the prudent em-
ployer should take careful steps early in employment contract negotia-
tions to affirm that it is an "at-will" employer. Such steps might in-
clude displaying prominently and conspicuously on the employment 
application a disclaimer of "for cause" employment and stating that no 
subsequent representations by supervisors, personnel directors, or 
others, and no industry practices or any prior course of dealing will 
alter the status of the relationship. 200 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Since the late 1950s, state courts have begun recogmzmg excep-
tions to the long-standing presumption that indefinite hirings are "at-
will." Some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have begun to 
construe one or several of the recognized exceptions so broadly and ap-
ply the exceptions so liberally that the traditional employment-at-will 
presumption has been emasculated and now serves merely to provide a 
theoretical framework for analysis. Because of the broadly applied ex-
ceptions, employers wishing to maintain their "employment-at-will" 
status must now take affirmative steps to rebut facts that would impli-
cate "termination for cause only" employment. 
justin R. Olsen 
200. The author does not advocate that these steps would always make the most business 
sense. Such a determination must be left to the individual employers. The precautions suggested 
here are offered only as combative measures to rebuttal of the at-will presumption. 
